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Summary: The aim of this paper is to study a possible connection between the
characteristics of the labour market, namely, employment protection and flex-
ibility, and the dynamics of the housing market. More specifically, this contribu-
tion analyses whether the poor quality of employment in a given economy
could cause the collapse of the housing market and impairs its recovery. In the
second stage of our analysis, we provide estimates for Spain over the period 
1984-2014. In doing so, the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test
for cointegration is employed.
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Several episodes of housing bubbles occurred in the last decade across different 
economies, e.g. the US, the UK, Spain, etc… However, the response of the housing 
market, and subsequently, the behaviour of the rest of the economy have been quite 
different in each case. The Spanish case could be considered as the most extreme one 
in view of the subsequent collapse of the labour market, which seven years later is 
still exhibiting unemployment rates above 23%. In terms of the relationship between 
these two markets, economists have only focused on providing some evidence of 
how homeownership contributes to increase unemployment via reducing labour mo-
bility. However, there is no study, which responds to the question of whether the in-
stitutional set up of the labour market could contribute to mitigate the housing cycle, 
and subsequently, the business cycle.  
In this context, we need to explore whether the level of employment protection 
and other characteristics of the labour market could affect the size and duration of the 
downturn of the market. Economists could argue that countries, which are characte-
rised by low employment protection and high flexibility, present stronger cycles 
since this could accelerate job destruction after the collapse and exacerbate the down-
turn of the market. From a mainstream perspective, high flexibility could lead to a 
quicker recovery, i.e. it shortens the duration of the downturn. However, this kind of 
propositions are more controversial than they seem to be at first sight in view of the 
role, which aggregate demand and income can play in the evolution of the economy.  
As far as we are concerned the relationship between housing and labour mar-
kets has been only explored in order to assess a possible contribution of homeowner-
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ship to the development of unemployment (David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. 
Oswald 2013; Jani-Petri Laamanen 2013). However, there is a gap in the existing 
literature in terms of studying the presence of pro-cyclical effects on the housing 
market, which emanates from the labour market at the macro level. This paper is a 
pioneering one in its field since there is no contribution that focuses on how the insti-
tutional set up of the labour market can affect residential investment. 
In the second stage of our analysis, we proceed to test the theoretical relation-
ship put forward by means of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test 
for cointegration. This econometric technique is applied to obtain some empirical 
evidence in the case of Spain over the period 1984-2014. 
The layout of this contribution is organised as follows. Section 1 presents our 
conceptual framework. Sections 2 and 3 elaborate on the econometric technique and 
the data, which have been employed to test our conceptual framework. Section 4 re-
fers to some empirical evidence, which has motivated this study. Section 5 focuses 
on our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
 
1. Conceptual Framework  
 
For the purpose of this paper, we assume an economy characterised by “cheap” dis-
missals, i.e. an economy where employment protection is low. Under such circums-
tances, we can hypothesise that entrepreneurs will dismiss some of their workers as 
soon as they perceive a decline in their demand, which is maintained for a few 
months. Low skilled and young workers who can be easily replaced during the re-
covery would be the first ones to be dismissed. Those who get into debt to become 
first time home buyers would struggle to repay their debts. Eventually, this would 
end up in an episode of foreclosures and evictions. If this phenomenon is strong 
enough commercial banks would be forced to sell these properties below the market 
price in an attempt to balance their assets. This would accelerate the decline of house 
prices and curb the volume of new developments. The effects of the decline of one of 
the components of aggregate demand would spread to the rest the economy in view 
of the Keynesian multiplier. In the next iteration, lower aggregate demand would 
provoke another “wave” of dismissals, which would exacerbate the downturn and 
impact negatively on the demand for housing and residential investment. 
In order to assess whether that mechanism was operating to “catalyse” the 
downturn of the housing market and impair its recovery after the last wave of “bub-
bles”, which happened in some developed economies in 2007-2008, we propose a 
conceptual framework that is rooted in Philip Arestis and Ana R. González-Martínez 
(2014). The latter study concentrates on a variable, which traditionally has played a 
crucial role in the recovery of the market, i.e. real residential investment. The study 
of this variable is relevant for our purposes, since investment in dwellings can be 
considered as a proxy of the level of activity of the housing market. More specifical-
ly, Arestis and González-Martínez (2014) summarise the dynamics of the housing 
market by means of two equations, namely, demand for and supply of housing. In 
this theoretical framework, the demand for housing is defined as a function of house 
prices, real disposable income, mortgage rates, the volume of credit to the private 
sector and unemployment; while the supply of housing is a positive function of house 
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prices and real residential investment. Subsequently, it is assumed that the model is 
in equilibrium that allows to set both relationships equal to each other and to solve 
the relevant equation with respect to real residential investment. The resulting rela-
tionship suggests that residential investment is positively related to house prices, dis-
posable income and the volume of credit; while it is negatively influenced by the rate 
of interest of loans for housing and the rate of unemployment.  
In terms of this paper, two variables which are discussed extensively in Arestis 
and González-Martínez (2014) are extremely relevant, i.e. real disposable income 
and unemployment. The former is a key element to determine housing affordability, 
while the latter is an indicator of the level of activity of the labour market and also a 
proxy for uncertainty. Considering a theoretical framework along the lines described 
above, it is sensible to assume that the institutional set up of the labour market, which 
affects unemployment (Giuseppe Bertola, Tito Boeri, and Sandrine Cazes 1999; 
Pierre Cahuc and Fabien Postel-Vinay 2002), could eventually affect negatively the 
demand for housing through different channels: (i) job insecurity discourages the 
formation of new households (Sascha O. Becker et al. 2010), which curbs the de-
mand for housing; (ii) job precariousness impairs homeownership in a context of 
strong macroprudential policy (see Janet Ford 1998 for further discussion of the rela-
tionship between job insecurity and home ownership); (iii) a removal of the existing 
employment protection would accelerate job destruction (see EL PAÍS 2014 for 
some evidence in the Spanish case after the reform implemented in 2012), which 
could lead the housing market to shorter and deeper cycles, as explained in the intro-
duction. Some light on this issue is needed to provide policy makers with another 
“tool” to intervene in the market, and prevent them to increase “flexibility” in the 
labour market at the “wrong” moment.  
Moving on to the characterisation of the institutional set up of the labour mar-
ket, we propose to account for the following features of the labour market: (a) share 
of full-time equivalent (FTE) employment over total employment; (b) an indicator 
which refers to employment protection legislation and captures the procedures and 
costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers; (c) another indicator 
which refers to employment protection legislation and accounts for the procedures 
involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts.  
The last two items are covered by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Employment database (OECD 2013). On the 
one hand, the “Strictness of employment protection - individual and collective dis-
missals (regular contracts)” indicator accounts for: (1) procedural inconveniences 
that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such as notification and con-
sultation requirements; (2) notice periods and severance pay, which typically vary by 
tenure of the employee; (3) difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the circums-
tances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the 
employer in the event that a dismissal is found to be unfair. On the other hand, the 
“Strictness of employment protection - temporary contracts” is computed by taking 
into account information related to the types of work for which fixed-term contracts 
are permitted; also their length, existing legislation about the establishment and oper-
ation of temporary work agencies and requirements for agency workers to receive the 
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same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm, which could even-
tually increase the cost of using temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers 
on permanent basis. 
Our contribution suggests that a removal of employment protection as defined 
by the “Strictness of employment protection - individual and collective dismissals 
(regular contracts)” indicator will affect negatively the demand for housing, and sub-
sequently, households’ investment in housing assets. This negative effect feeds 
through two different channels. On the one hand, we can expect a change in individ-
uals’ behaviour who will take their decisions regarding investment on housing in an 
environment characterised by a higher degree of uncertainty. This will depress poten-
tial demand for housing, since some individuals that are employed in precarious jobs 
would opt for renting their properties rather than getting into the housing market as 
home owners. This negative effect, which emanates from rising uncertainty, would 
also affect commercial banks’ behaviour. More specifically, tightening the eligibility 
criteria to get into debt is expected, which curbs effective demand for housing, and 
eventually affects real residential investment. On the other hand, another dimension, 
which would be affected by the removal of employment protection is income, via the 
severance pay that is obtained by unemployed following their dismissal. A reduction 
of the amount, which is perceived as severance pay, would compromise the financial 
solvency of some households who would be unable to meet their financial obliga-
tions. This would contribute to an increase in foreclosures and evictions that accele-
rate the downturn of the housing market.  
Moreover, we can expect that those changes in the existing body of legisla-
tion, which favour the demand for labour, and eventually increase employment, 
would increase disposable income. Rising income improves housing affordability as 
has been discussed extensively by James M. Poterba (1984), OECD (2005), and Luca 
Gattini and Ioannis Ganoulis (2012). In terms of our conceptual framework, this type 
of change in the existing body of regulation would be measured by the “Strictness of 
employment protection - temporary contracts” indicator. We may note that the type 
of employment creation, to which this index refers, is not a high quality one. This is 
so since what is promoted with this type of measures is employment on fixed-terms 
basis during longer periods. This type of hiring has further implications in terms of 
the housing market. We can expect a positive indirect effect on real residential in-
vestment, which emanates from an increase in the demand for housing under a rental 
regime. This is so since those individuals who have fixed-term contracts would not 
be qualified to obtain those financial resources, which are required to move on and 
climb the property “ladder”. However, this would create an incentive for individuals 
who are more solvent to invest in the property market in view of the mentioned ex-
pansion of the rental market.  
Apart from that there is an additional effect, which emanates from an increase 
in employment protection. We refer to the positive relationship between employment 
protection and productivity as highlighted by Giulio Fella (2005) and Michèle Belot, 
Jan Boone, and Jan C. van Ours (2007). When rising productivity affects positively 
disposable income, this would further enhance the loop “income-demand for hous-
ing-residential investment”.  
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Furthermore, our approach to categorise the institutional set up of the labour 
market accounts for the evolution of full-time employment. More specifically, we 
propose the inclusion of the ratio “full-time employment-to-total employment”, 
which permits us to build a proxy to measure job quality in general terms. It is sensi-
ble to assume that low quality jobs are more sensitive to the business cycle (see, also, 
William Mitchell, Jenny Myers, and James Juniper 2005, for further discussion and 
empirical evidence of the dynamics of the full-time and part-time jobs during the 
business cycle). In other words, one might expect that part-time jobs are the first ones 
to disappear during the first stage of the recession, especially if they are associated 
with low-skilled job as has been happening traditionally in Spain (see, also, Sandalio 
Gómez 2014, for further details). That premise gives us a first intuition to assume 
that may be the case in which those economies where part-time jobs have a higher 
relative weight over total employment can exhibit, ceteris paribus, a deeper business 
cycle and deeper housing cycle as well. This phenomenon could be more relevant in 
terms of the labour market if part-time jobs are popular amongst young adults, who 
have found in this type of jobs the way to obtain their first working experience. In 
this context, we aim to explore the hypothesis that job destruction affects more se-
verely part-time employment during the downturn, and impairs part-time workers to 
get on the property “ladder” and re-activate the market.  
At this stage, we proceed to encapsulate the discussion above as shown in Eq-
uation (1):  
 
 
),,,( dftbahh yrepepii   
             +    /+    + 
(1)
 
where ih accounts for real residential investment; epa is the “Strictness of employ-
ment protection - individual and collective dismissals (regular contracts)” indicator; 
epb refers to the “Strictness of employment protection - temporary contracts” indica-
tor; rft denotes the ratio “full-time employment-to-total employment”; yd stands for 
real disposable income. The sign below a variable indicates the partial derivative of 
the dependent variable with respect to that variable. 
 
2. Econometric Technique 
 
A preliminary step to the modelling exercise, which has been undertaken for the pur-
pose of this paper, is to check for the order of integration of those time series that our 
sample comprises of. In doing so, the following tests are employed: (i) the Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test (David A. Dickey and Wayne A. Fuller 1979, 1981); (ii) 
the Phillips-Perron test (Peter C. B. Phillips and Pierre Perron 1988); (iii) the GLS-
based Dickey-Fuller test (Charles R. Nelson and Charles I. Plosser 1982); (iv) the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (Denis Kwiatkowski et al. 1992); (v) the 
Lee and Strazicich’s (Junsoo Lee and Mark C. Stazicich 2003) unit root test. The 
utilisation of the later prevents the researcher from assuming the wrong order of inte-
gration due to the existence of structural breaks in the data. The results of all these 
 6 Philip Arestis and Ana Rosa González-Martínez 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2015, Vol. 62, Issue 1, pp. 1-14 
tests suggest that our sample contains trend stationary and first-difference stationary 
variables1.  
In order to deal with the existence of variables which are I(0) and I(1), the 
ARDL bounds test for cointegration (Mohammad H. Pesaran, Yongcheol Shin, and 
Richard J. Smith 2001) is employed. In addition to that, Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
highlight the suitability of this technique in the case of small or finite sample sizes 
(see, also, Paresh K. Narayan 2005). Another important characteristic of this ap-
proach is the fact that all the variables involved in the estimation process are treated 
as endogenous elements, while the long-run and short-run parameters are estimated 
simultaneously. More specifically, the ARDL bounds testing approach implies the 
estimation of the conditional error correction model (ECM) shown in Equation (2):  
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where all the variables have the same meaning as in Equation (1), with the exemption 
of X, which is a vector that includes the two variants of the employment protection 
indicator, which are denoted as epa and epb respectively, the ratio “full-time em-
ployment-to-total employment”, rft, and real disposable income, yd; β0, which is the 
intercept of the regression; ε, which is a vector of the error white noise process. The 
estimation of the mentioned error correction model is carried out by means of OLS. 
We may also note that in the ARDL bounds test for cointegration framework a 
F-test is utilised to study a possible co-movement among the variables under scruti-
ny. In order to apply this test, two sets of critical values are employed (Pesaran, Shin, 
and Smith 2001): (a) the lower bound, which considers that all the time series are 
purely trend stationary; (b) the upper bound, which refers to the case where the va-
riables are first-difference stationary, i.e. they contain a unit root. Cointegration is 
found when the F-statistics exceeds the upper bound. In order to select the appropri-
ate lag length structure for the relevant error correction model the Schwarz Bayesian 
information criterion (SBC) is considered. We assume a maximum lag length of 3 
periods as suggested by the relevant literature (Walter Enders 2004). 
Finally, our econometric results are validated by means of of the following 
choice of tests: (1) the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM statistic (Leslie G. 
Godfrey 1978; Trevor S. Breusch 1979), which tests for the lack of autocorrelation; 
(2) a test based on the regression of squared residuals, which checks for the absence 
of heteroskedasticity; (3) a normality test, which is based on the skewness and kurto-
sis of residuals. Moreover, the stability of the parameters, which have been estimated 
is checked by applying the CUSUM and the CUSUM of squares tests (Robert L. 
Brown, James Durbin, and James M. Evans 1975)2. 
Three econometric packages are required to carry out this analysis: GAUSS 10 
to run the Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) unit root test; EViews 8 to conduct other unit 
root/stationarity test and Microfit 4.1 to estimate the conditional ECM model.  
 
                                                        
1 The results of these tests are not reported but they are available from the authors upon request. 
2 The results of the CUSUM and the CUSUM of squares tests are not reported but they can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. 
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3. Data 
 
In order to test our theoretical proposition we utilise annual data for Spain over the 
period 1984-2014. The temporal scope of our research is determined by the availabil-
ity of relevant time series, as explained below.  
More specifically, we employ data published by two different organisations. 
On the one hand, the OECD Employment database3 is consulted. This databank is the 
source for the two indicators of employment protection that we have utilised, i.e. 
“Strictness of employment protection - individual and collective dismissals (regular 
contracts)” and “Strictness of employment protection - temporary contracts”. On the 
other hand, the AMECO databank4, which is maintained by the European Commis-
sion’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, is utilised. More spe-
cifically, the following time series are obtained from this data provider: (i) Gross 
national disposable income per head of population; (ii) Gross fixed capital formation 
at 2010 prices: dwellings; (iii) Price deflator domestic demand including stocks; (iv) 
Employment, full-time equivalents: total economy (National accounts); (v) Employ-
ment, persons: all domestic industries (National accounts). 
At this stage we need to clarify that the data obtained from the OECD sources 
was extrapolated and extended to cover the period 1984-2014 since this data source 
ends in 2013. In doing so, the rate of growth of the first and last year available are 
utilised to obtain data for 1984 and 2014.  
 
4. Key Figures: Spain (1984-2014) 
 
To begin with, some stylised facts are presented in order to characterise the evolution 
of the Spanish labour market since 1984. Figure 1 shows the evolution of full-time 
and total employment over the period under consideration.  
Figure 1 could be interpreted as a deterioration of the average quality of jobs 
in the Spanish labour market in view of a decline of the share of FTE over total em-
ployment in the last 30 years. Economists could also argue that an increase in part-
time employment is not a negative phenomenon per se, since it could be the result of 
a “modernisation” of the labour market in order to provide better opportunities to 
reconcile working life and childcare to those female workers who wish to join this 
type of employment during a period of their life. However, it is very difficult to sup-
port that argument in the case of the economy under consideration, where female 
unemployment rate has been twice its male counterpart (OECD 2004; Olga Alonso-
Villar and Coral del Río 2005). Additional evidence against that “optimistic” hypo-
thesis is also provided by the high job insecurity for young women in the case of this 
economy (Marta Ibañez 2010). 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2015. Employment Policies 
and Data. http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm (accessed January 30, 
2015). 
4 European Commission (EC). 2015. Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm (accessed January 30, 2015). 
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Source: Authors' elaboration based on AMECO data. 
 
 
Figure 1  Evolution of Employment (1984-2014) 
 
Moreover, we report the evolution of an additional set of variables: involunta-
ry workers, short-term economic workers and discouraged workers to complete the 
“picture” of the Spanish labour market in the last three decades5.  
 
Source: Authors' elaboration based on OECD data. 
 
 
Figure 2  Involuntary Workers, Short-Term Economic Workers and Discourage Workers (1987-2013) 
                                                        
5 In addition to the econometric analysis, which is shown in Section 5, we have carried out some prelimi-
nary work that explores these variables; i.e. involuntary workers, short-term economic workers and dis-
couraged workers. These are treated as possible indicators, which could be included in our econometric 
analysis to capture the characteristics of the labour market. However, weak evidence is found in the case 
of the explanatory power of these variables. The justification for undertaking this exercise is due to Ares-
tis and González-Martínez (2014) who demonstrate a negative and strong relationship between unem-
ployment and residential investment.  
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Figure 2 shows a dramatic increase in involuntary unemployment after 2004. 
That pattern accelerates in the aftermath of the collapse of the housing market which 
occurred in 2007. Figure 2 also shows how the evolution of discouraged workers 
reflects the path described by involuntary unemployment. Finally, another important 
variable which is reported in Figure 2, is the number of short-term economic work-
ers. “Economic short-time workers” accounts for those workers who are working less 
than usual due to business slack, plant stoppage, or other technical reasons. Although 
the pattern followed by this variable prior to 2003 was quite stable, there is an in-
crease in the number of workers that fall into this category after that date. The in-
crease is quite intense after 2007 and pick up again after 2012. A first interpretation 
of these figures, suggests that the labour market could be impairing the recovery of 
the housing market, due to the existence of negative expectations regarding the future 
evolution of employment, and subsequently, income6. 
For the purposes of this paper the effects of the Spanish labour market reform, 
which took place in 2012 are not discussed since such discussion is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, in terms of our conceptual framework, changes in the 2012-
regulation along those lines should be considered as a “negative” phenomenon since 
some existing employment protection was removed after its implementation. In other 
words, the relaxation of some conditions for dismissals to happen have facilitated its 
occurrence and could have boosted the number of repossessions and evictions in the 
segment of workers whose dismissal would not have happened in the previous insti-
tutional set up. Unfortunately, the lack of specific data to test that hypothesis pre-
vents us from drawing final and firm conclusions.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
 
Table 1 displays the results of the ARDL bounds testing approach for cointegration. 
We may note that all the variables are expressed in logarithms, which permits to in-
terpret the estimated parameters as elasticities. The relevant set of tests, which vali-
dates our econometric model is also shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1  Bounds Test for Cointegration 
 
  Autoregressive distributed lag estimates ARDL (2,1,2,0,1) 
W-test 32.8168 [0.000] 
Serial correlation 0.0330 [0.856] 
Normality 4.6391 [0.098] 
Heteroscedasticity 0.9736 [0.324] 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Our econometric results suggest that a cointegration relationship to support 
our testable hypothesis is found at 1% significance level as indicated by the Wald test 
                                                        
6 See, also, Francisco Carballo-Cruz (2011) for a detailed description of the job destruction process, 
which took place in the Spanish economy after the burst of the housing bubble.  
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reported above. The conditional error correction model which is estimated for the 
purpose of this paper satisfies the hypothesis of normality, lack of autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity of the residuals.  
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters of the long-run equilibrium model, 
along with the error correction model, which captures the dynamics of the variables 
in the short-run.  
 
Table 2  Econometric Results (Spain, 1984-2014) 
  
  Intercept L_ep
a L_epb L_rft L_id   
Long-run relationship -3.6683 -1.0601* 4.1000*** -7.3583* 2.4510***  
  Intercept ΔL_epa ΔL_epb ΔL_rft ΔL_id ΔL_ih EL_ih 
Short-run relationship -1.1744 -0.03868(0) 0.37617(0) -2.3558* (0) 2.9265*** (0) 0.3024** (1) -0.3201*** 
   -0.56534*** (1)  
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
significance levels respectively. Number of lag(s) is provided in the parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
To begin with the discussion of our results, we concentrate on the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. Our estimates have identified a positive elasticity, which 
emanates from real disposable income (2.45), id. Moreover, our results report a 
strong and negative elasticity, which emanates from changes in the ratio “full-time 
employment-to-total employment” (-7.35), rft. As has been discussed in our concep-
tual framework, we can expect a negative impact of that ratio on the demand for 
housing, and subsequently, on residential investment in those cases where the rise of 
that ratio responds to a decline in total employment while full-time employment is 
maintained stable or less affected by job destruction than part-time employment. This 
statement is perfectly applicable in the case of the Spanish labour market, which is a 
“dual” one, characterised by strong job precariousness for outsiders, along with a 
high level of employment protection, which is enjoyed by insiders (Maia Güel and 
Barbara Petrongolo 2007). In this context, it is fair to assume that job destruction has 
been confined to part-time and precarious employments, while it did not affect full-
time employment in the same way. 
Furthermore, our econometric analysis highlights some co-movement in the 
long run between the two indicators of employment protection and real residential 
investment. However, careful consideration needs to be given to the interpretation of 
these two elements of our model. On the one hand, the “Strictness of employment 
protection - individual and collective dismissals (regular contracts)” indicator, epa, 
which is included in our analysis, measures the strictness of regulation of individual 
dismissal of employees on regular/indefinite contracts. More specifically, the nega-
tive effect, which emanates from this indicator, reflects the following, that increase 
job insecurity and depress individual expectations: (a) a “relaxation” of the condi-
tions in which workers can be dismissed; (b) a reduction in the notification period 
and the severance pay, which is associated to the dismissal; (c) a reduction of the 
compensation for unfair dismissal and the lack of a possible reinstatement following 
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unfair dismissal. This increase in jobs insecurity would affect negatively the demand 
for housing by the following channels: (1) commercial banks would tighten credit 
standards, which curb the demand for housing and residential investment; (2) during 
the downturn, “cheap and quick” dismissals would take place, which curb the de-
mand for housing and could increase the number of foreclosures and evictions. This 
negative impact, which has just been discussed, is captured by our model, as indi-
cated by the negative estimated elasticity (-1.06). 
On the other hand, our model identifies a positive relationship between the in-
dicator that measures “Strictness of employment protection - temporary contracts”, 
epb, and real residential investment. This positive coefficient can be interpreted along 
the following lines. The “Strictness of employment protection - temporary contracts” 
indicator could reflect a change in the institutional set up where there are more cases 
in which fixed-term contracts are applicable; at the same time it is possible for work-
ers to be hired on fixed-term bases for a longer period. These changes could provoke 
an increase in the level of employment, which subsequently contributes to a rise in 
income. Rising income would impact positively the demand for housing. At this 
stage two mechanisms could operate: (i) individuals who are employed on precarious 
jobs could demand housing for rental, which creates demand for housing for inves-
tors; (ii) in a context where there is no strong prudential policy operating, individuals 
who are hired on precarious jobs could get into debt and demand new units. Both 
increases in the demand for housing would provoke an increase in real residential 
investment. In this case this impact has been quantified as a 4.10 elasticity. Unfortu-
nately, the lack of appropriate data prevents us from isolating the mentioned direct 
and indirect effects on the demand for housing. However, we should mentioned the 
fact that in the case of the US there are contributions (Jaison R. Abel and Richard 
Deitz 2010), which have referred to the “infamous” role played by job precariousness 
in the context of the US sub-prime crisis where it contributed to accelerating the 
downturn. 
Moving onto the error correction model, only two explanatory variables are 
found significant. On the one hand, we find a negative impact, which emanates from 
changes in the ratio “full-time employment-to-total employment”, i.e. a 1% increase 
of the mentioned ratio will provoke a 2.35% and 0.56% decline in real residential 
investment. On the other hand, we have estimated that changes in real disposable 
income would impact positively investment in dwelling in the short-run. More spe-
cifically, a 1% increase in income would induce a 2.92% increase in residential activ-
ity. In addition to that, our short-run model also shows a positive elasticity of house-
holds’ investment in dwelling in the previous period (0.30). This short-run model 
also includes an error correction term, which suggests that 32% of the disequilibria 
between the short-run and the long-run are eliminated in each period.  
The stability of our results has been checked by means of the CUSUM and the 
CUSUM of squares tests (Brown, Durbin, and Evans 1975). Both tests suggest the 
stability of our estimations since the plot of the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares 
statistics fall within the 5% critical bounds of parameter stability for the model. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of job precariousness as a potential driver 
of the housing cycle. As discussed above, our empirical findings have identified a 
positive effect of income on demand for housing, and subsequently, on investment in 
dwelling. Our model also has identified an increase in real residential investment, 
which relates from the employment creation that happens on a fixed-term basis. On 
the other hand, the demand for housing and real residential investment do not benefit 
from either a relative increase of part-time jobs or a reduction of employment protec-
tion.  
Our analysis has provided some justification of the hypothesis that job inse-
curity impairs the recovery of the housing market, through its negative effects on 
income and expectations. A better understanding of these links is needed since the 
recovery of the housing market should be based on a “healthy” labour market that 
protects its workers, and permits the recovery of economic activity. The results of 
our investigation challenge the mainstream approach, which inspired the 2012 labour 
market reform implemented in Spain and suggests that policy makers should be pru-
dent when increasing flexibility in the labour market during the downturn of the 
housing market. This is so in view of the fact that job destruction could be accele-
rated by a decline of employment protection during the downturn which eventually 
affects negatively aggregate demand, and subsequently the demand for housing. We 
may clarify that any attempt to analyse the impact of the mentioned labour reforms 
falls beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this paper is broader, as it has at-
tempted to bring some light to the issue of a possible role of the institutional set up of 
the labour market in the intensity of the housing cycle.  
The empirical evidence produced in this contribution has opened the “door” 
for several questions, which need to be explored in the future such as the importance 
of adopting measures that target employment protection and flexibility in different 
segments of the population; for example, young workers who can be identified with 
first-home buyers and workers aged above 45 who are considered as prime savers.  
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